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ABSTRACT
The majority of economists share the view that a firm—even a large corporation— should serve the
exclusive interests of its shareholders. This paper argues that shareholder value maximization is not a so-
cially optimal criterion when large firms make investment decisions which either decrease the probability
of adverse technological outcomes or increase the probability of producing more efficiently (firm-specific
innovations). Such investments affect the expected prices on the product and labor markets on which
the firms operate, thereby influencing not only the firms’ expected profits but also the expected welfare
of consumers and workers ( a pecuniary externality). This suggests that a firm’s criterion should include
the welfare of its stakeholders. We show that when firms are stakeholder oriented in that they maximize
a weighted sum of shareholder value and their contribution to consumer and employee welfare, then the
resulting stakeholder equilibrium improves upon the shareholder equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
That all firms, even large corporations, should maximize their profit has long been a basic
tenet of economics and remains the dominant paradigm of the corporate finance literature
(Shleifer-Vishny (1997)). That profit maximization by large firms exploiting their market
power typically leads to lower production and higher prices than optimal has not changed the
view that profit should be maximized, but rather has led to the adoption of laws restricting
the behavior of large corporations.1 The message of this paper is that even if these laws and
the associated agencies created to implement them are successful in enforcing competition on
the product and labor markets, and even if a corporation does not create standard direct
externalities, profit maximization is still not a socially optimal objective. For corporations,
like all businesses, operate in an environment of uncertainty and the success or failure of a
large corporation may have a significant impact not only on its shareholders, but also on
the consumers it serves and on the workers it employs. This, as we show, creates a form of
externality which is present as soon as non-negligible firms make investment decisions which
influence the likelihood of success or failure of their stochastic technologies.
To explore this idea we consider a setting where a firm’s investment has a positive probabil-
ity of improving the firm’s technology—the greater the investment the greater the probability
of success—but the technological improvement is specific to the firm, and does not affect other
firms’ technologies. The potential improvement can be viewed as a “firm-specific innovation”—
it has the characteristic of a process innovation, since with some probability it decreases the
marginal cost of production, but does not have the spillover or knowledge effect which has
been the focus of the growth literature and the literature on innovation. Examples of such
firm-specific innovations would be the restructuring of a company, improvements in the tech-
nology or design of its product or, in the other direction, investment expenditures on quality,
maintenance, and control procedures to minimize the risk of adverse technological outcomes.
In this setting we study whether the profit motive leads to an efficient choice of investment.
To focus on the kernel of the argument, in much of the paper we study a “benchmark” model
in which there is a single firm exposed to risk and a competitive fringe which is a stand-in for
the rest of the production sector. The firm is “non-negligible” in the sense that the prices on
the product and labor markets differ depending on whether the ‘good’ or the ‘bad’ technology
is realized: thus the firm is sufficiently large to have “market impact”. It is clear that if,
once the technology is realized, the firm decides to exploit its market power in its choice of
labor (output) on the spot markets, then there will be inefficiency due to oligopolistic pricing.
Since from a theoretical perspective it is useful to distinguish between the different sources of
imperfection due to the presence of large firms, in most of the paper we factor out this latter
source of inefficiency by assuming that all firms act as price takers on the product and labor
markets.
This permits us to identify a novel source of inefficiency for a non-negligible profit-maximizing
firm. Since investment by the firm shifts probability to the outcome where it is more productive,
reducing the expected price of its output and increasing the expected wage of its employees,
the firm’s investment influences the expected utilities of consumers and workers: maximizing
1Antitrust Law in the US, Competition Law in Europe and the agencies charged with their enforcement, like
the Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission.
expected profit does not internalize the effect of the investment on the expected utilities of
consumers and workers, so that “shareholder value maximization” is not the correct “social
criterion” and leads to systematic underinvestment by the firm. The inefficiency can be at-
tributed to a form of pecuniary externality of the firm’s investment: increasing investment
changes expected prices and wages and, at a profit maximizing equilibrium, the increased cost
of investment equals the increase in the firm’s expected profit on the spot markets, but is less
than the increase in expected total surplus.
The presence of externalities brings to mind the use of government taxes and subsidies
as a corrective device. Indeed Greenwald-Stiglitz (1986) have presented a general equilibrium
framework for studying Pareto improving taxes (subsidies) in the presence of either technolog-
ical or pecuniary externalities. In our setting a subsidy to the firm’s investment would improve
on the shareholder equilibrium: however we argue that the internal nature of the investment
and the possible improvements to which it leads make it difficult for a regulator to have suf-
ficient information to subsidize exactly the type of expenses that would reduce the risks of
adverse outcomes or improve the productive efficiency of the firm. Assuming that agents close
to the firm—the shareholders, the consumers and certainly the workers—have better infor-
mation than a regulator about the costs and possible improvements to the technology of a
company, it seems natural to study whether the firm can be led to internalize the externality
by including the interests of consumers and workers into the criterion it uses for its choice of
investment.
In Section 4 we study the behavior of a stakeholder firm that maximizes the sum of the sur-
pluses of its shareholders, consumers and workers. We show that if the firm can be considered
independently of other firms—for example if it is a “natural monopoly”—then the stakeholder
objective leads to a socially optimal investment. The main problem is then to obtain informa-
tion on the surpluses of consumers and workers. We suggest that implementing the Coasian
approach of creating marketable rights, “consumer rights” or the right to buy from the firm,
and “worker rights” or the right to work for the firm, can serve to elicit these surpluses and
provide a measurable way of evaluating the performance of the stakeholder firm.
When there are several firms competing on the same product and labor markets, if a
stakeholder firm were to maximize the sum of the surpluses of its own stakeholders, it would
exaggerate the difference in benefit between the good and the bad outcome, and would be
led to over-invest to make the successful outcome more likely. For such a calculation would
exclude the stakeholders of competing firms who are also affected by the firm’s outcome, and
their interests are at odds with those of the stakeholders of the firm under consideration. Thus
there is under-investment when only profit is taken into account, and over-investment if the
total surplus of its own stakeholders is used as the firm’s criterion. However if we introduce a
”stakeholder oriented” firm that puts most of the weight on its shareholder value but also gives
a small positive weight to consumer and worker surpluses, the resulting equilibrium outcome
improves on the shareholder equilibrium.
Relation to the Literature. Our success/failure model has a number of different interpre-
tations. If the implicit reference point is the ‘bad’ or costly technology then the model can be
viewed as a model of innovation. There are however important differences with the models of
innovation in the IO and macro growth literature2. First, we consider firm-specific innovations,
which do not have spillover effects on other firms: patents are irrelevant for such innovations.
Second most of the innovation literature assumes that firms operate with constant marginal
cost so that monopolistic profit guaranteed by a patent is necessary to cover the research cost
and provide the incentive to innovate. By contrast, we assume that firms behave competitively
and have technologies with decreasing marginal returns.3 Third, unlike most of the IO liter-
ature, we adopt a general equilibrium approach that permits us to relate our results to the
Arrow-Debreu welfare theorems, and also serve to clarify that innovation, even firm-specific,
generates externalities not only on consumers but also on workers, through general equilibrium
effects on labor markets.
If in the ‘bad’ outcome the firm does not operate (i.e. has zero output) while in the ‘good’
outcome it is productive, and if the probability chosen by the firm is either zero or one, then
the model is a model of entry akin to the competitive version of Mankiw-Whinston (1986).
Although our model focuses more on the investment of an existing firm rather than the entry
of a new firm into a market, our under-investment result corresponds to the insufficient entry
result in the competitive version of Mankiw-Whinston.
On the other hand if the implicit reference point is the ‘good’ technology, then investment
serves to decrease the likelihood of the adverse outcome in which the firm ends up with the
bad technology. The investment refers to expenditures on quality control, maintenance and
design procedures and other risk control procedures which seek to reduce the probability of
malfunction or design flaws. To our knowledge little attention has been given to the view
that the profit motive does not induce large corporate enterprises to spend enough to avoid
the occurrence of adverse outcomes that can have a significant negative impact on economic
agents beyond its shareholders.4
Organization of paper. Section 2 introduces the benchmark model and the concept of a
shareholder equilibrium in which firms use the criterion of profit maximization: it shows that
there is always under-investment in a shareholder equilibrium. Possible ways of resolving the
inefficiency of investment are discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 examines the idea of using a
stakeholder approach to resolve the problem of under-investment in a shareholder equilibrium.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Inefficiency of Shareholder Equilibrium
Consider a two-period stochastic production economy with a finite number of firms. There
are three goods: a produced good, a composite good called “money” (used as the numeraire)
2See Tirole (1998), Aghion-Howitt (1998), Acemoglu (2009) for excellent surveys of this literature.
3The model of endogenous growth of Hellwig-Irmen (2001) also assumes competitive markets and decreasing
returns. In their model firms are negligible but their innovations automatically enter (with a delay of one
period) into the general technological knowledge of the economy. Since these future benefits cannot be priced
in a market and hence do not enter the profit of an innovating firm, there is also under-investment in their
competitive equilibrium.
4An exception is Allen-Carletti-Marquez (2011) which is motivated by the cost incurred by workers who are
laid off when a firm goes bankrupt. They study how the pricing strategy of a “stakeholder firm”, which takes
into account in its objective function the cost of layoffs for its workers, differs from that of a “shareholder firm”
maximizing profit.
and labor. At date 0 the only available resource is money, a part of which can be used to
finance investment expenditures by the firms. Each firm faces production risk and operates
in an environment where its projects can be more or less successful. While a firm cannot
completely control its environment it can invest resources to increase the probability of better
outcomes. To keep the analysis simple we assume that each firm j = 1, . . . , J has two possible5
outcomes at date 1, a good technology f jg or a less productive technology f
j
b , and that incurring
expenditures γj can augment the probability pij of the good outcome f jg . Our objective is to
study whether the standard criterion of profit maximization by firms leads to socially optimal
choices (γ1, . . . , γJ) or if some other criterion may be required.
2.1 Benchmark Model
In the benchmark model only firm 1 is subject to risk and all other firms can be summarized by
a surrogate second firm6 with deterministic technology fˆ . At date 1 the first firm’s technology
will be one of the two production functions ys = fs(l) where s is either g or b. Each production
function fs : |R+ → |R+ is differentiable, increasing, concave and satisfies fs(0) = 0, s = g, b.
The marginal product of fg is uniformly higher than that of fb: f
′
g(l) > f
′
b(l),∀ l > 0, which
implies that fg(l) > fb(l),∀ l > 0, thus justifying the terminology that g is the good and b
the bad outcome. By choosing its investment expenditure at date 0, firm 1 determines the
probability pi of having the good outcome at date 1. The cost of investment is a function γ(pi)
of the probability pi, where γ : [0, 1) → |R+ is differentiable, increasing, strictly convex, and
satisfies γ(0) = γ′(0) = 0, γ′(pi)→∞ as pi → 1. To retain the symmetry of notation, we let pis
denote the probability of outcome s, s = g, b, with pig = pi and pib = 1 − pi. Firm 2 does not
face risk and makes no investment at date 0. It operates a technology fˆ(lˆ) at date 1 where fˆ
is differentiable, increasing, concave and satisfies fˆ(0) = 0. To avoid boundary solutions we
assume that all production functions satisfy the Inada condition f ′g(0) = f ′b(0) = fˆ
′(0) =∞.
There are three “classes” of agents: workers/employees, consumers, and finally capital-
ists/shareholders. Within each class there is a continuum of identical agents of mass 1. Each
worker is endowed with 1 unit of labor at date 1, consumes only money and has the utility
function
Uw(m, `) = m0 + δ
∑
s=g,b
pis
(
ms − v(`s)
)
,
where m = (m0,mg,mb) is a worker’s consumption of money and `s is the quantity of labor
sold to the firm in outcome s, s = g, b. The discount factor satisfies 0 < δ ≤ 1 and the disutility
of labor, v(`) : |R+ → |R, is differentiable, convex and increasing, with v(0) = 0, v′(0) = 0 and
v′(`) → ∞ if ` → 1. Throughout we will use the symbol “`” for the labor supplied by the
representative worker and “l” for the demand for labor by the firms.
Each consumer, who consumes both money and the produced good, has the utility function
U c(m, c) = m0 + δ
∑
s=g,b
pis
(
ms + u(cs)
)
,
5The analysis can be extended to a finite number of outcomes: this makes the analytical expressions more
complex, but does not change the fundamental nature of the insights we obtain.
6This is without loss of generality if all firms other than firm 1 are not subject to risk.
where c = (cg, cb) is the consumption of the produced good in the two outcomes, and u is
differentiable, strictly concave and increasing, with u(0) = 0 and u′(c)→∞ if c→ 0.
Finally there are capitalists (shareholders), who own the firms, consume only money and
have the same (linear) utility function
Uk(m) = m0 + δ
∑
s=g,b
pisms.
For reasons that we explain later, we assume that the two firms are owned by distinct subsets
of shareholders. The money endowments ei = (ei0, e
i
1), i = w, c, k are assumed to be sufficiently
large so that non-negativity constraints on consumption never bind. We let e0 = e
w
0 + e
c
0 + e
k
0,
e1 = e
w
1 + e
c
1 + e
k
1 denote the aggregate endowments of money at date 0 and 1, and denote by
E = (U, e, f, γ, fˆ) the economy with preferences and endowments (U i, ei)i=w,c,k and technologies
(f, γ, fˆ) for the firms.
2.2 Socially Optimal Investment
Given the quasi-linearity of the agents’ preferences, a Pareto optimum is an allocation7
(pi∗,m∗, c∗, `∗, l∗, lˆ∗) that maximizes the sum of the agents’ utilities
max
(pi,m,c,`,l,lˆ)≥0
∑
i=w,c,k
(
mi0 + δ
∑
s=g,b
pism
i
s
)
+ δ
∑
s=g,b
pis[u(cs)− v(`s)]
subject to the resource constraints for money, consumption and labor∑
i=w,c,k
mi0 + γ(pi) = e0,
∑
i=w,c,k
mis = e1,
cs = fs(ls) + fˆ(lˆs), `s = ls + lˆs, s = g, b. (1)
This is equivalent to finding (c∗, `∗, pi∗, l∗, lˆ∗) that solves
max
(c,`,pi,l,lˆ)≥0
e0 − γ(pi) + δ
∑
s=g,b
pis[e1 + u(cs))− v(`s)], (2)
subject to the resource constraints (1). The maximum problem (2) decomposes into the choice,
in each outcome s = g, b (at date 1) of consumption-labor allocations (c∗s, `∗s, l∗s , lˆ∗s) that maxi-
mize social welfare
Ws = u(cs)− v(`s), (3)
subject to the resources constraints (1), and firm 1’s choice of investment (at date 0) or more
directly the choice of the probability of success pi∗ that maximizes
δ(piW ∗g + (1− pi)W ∗b )− γ(pi), (4)
7We use the following notational convention: a letter without superscript or subscript summarizes the vector
of indexed values of the corresponding variable. For example, m =
(
(mi0,m
i
s), i = w, c, k, s = g, b
)
and
` = (`s)s=g,b
where W ∗g ,W ∗b are the optimized values of (3). The first-order conditions for the choice of
consumption-labor at date 1 are, for s = g, b :
u′(c∗s)f
′
s(l
∗
s) = u
′(c∗s)fˆ
′(lˆ∗s) = v
′(`∗s), c
∗
s = fs(l
∗
s) + fˆ(lˆ
∗
s), `
∗
s = l
∗
s + lˆ
∗
s (5)
Since the social welfare Ws in each outcome s is a strictly concave function, there is a unique
solution to the FOCs (5), which are necessary and sufficient for characterizing the optimal
allocation. Since fg(l) > fb(l) for all l > 0, Wg(l, lˆ) = u(fg(l) + fˆ(lˆ)) − v(l + lˆ) > u(fb(l) +
fˆ(lˆ)) − v(l + lˆ) = Wb(l, lˆ) so that W ∗g = max(l,lˆ)Wg(l, lˆ) > W ∗b = max(l,lˆ)Wb(l, lˆ). Again, this
justifies our notation that “g” is indeed the good social outcome. The FOC for the optimal
choice of investment by firm 1 at date 0 is given by
δ
(
W ∗g −W ∗b
)
= γ′(pi∗), (6)
and this has a unique solution pi∗ since γ′ increases from 0 to∞. (6) requires that the marginal
cost of increasing the probability of success equals the discounted social benefit of realizing the
good rather than the bad outcome of firm 1.
2.3 Shareholder Equilibrium
Consider a market equilibrium of the above economy assuming that both firms make their
choices in the best interests of their shareholders: both make a labor decision at date 1, and
firm 1 in addition makes an investment choice at date 0. Consumers buy the firms’ output and
workers sell their labor services on spot markets; the agents can also trade on asset markets
to redistribute their income. We show that the real side of such a market equilibrium can be
summarized by a vector (pi, l¯,
¯ˆ
l ) consisting of the probability of the good outcome, and the
labor choices in each technology outcome. This vector can then be compared with the Pareto
optimal choice (pi∗, l∗, lˆ∗) derived above.
At each date the price of the composite commodity (money) is normalized to 1. At date 0
agents trade a riskless bond promising one unit of money in each outcome s = g, b at date 1
with price 11+r where r is the interest rate. There is also an equity market at date 0 on which
the agents trade the shares of the firms, the price of equity being q for firm 1 and qˆ for firm 2.
At date 1 for each outcome s = g, b there are spot markets for labor and the produced good
with prices (ws, ps), s = g, b. Since the date 1 payoff of the bond is (1, 1), and the payoffs of the
shares of firm 1 are different in the two outcomes s = g, b, the bond and firm 1’s equity have
linearly independent payoff streams, so that the financial markets are complete with respect
to the uncertainty g, b.
Firm 1 makes two types of choices: at date 0 it selects its investment expenditure which
determines the probability pi of its ‘good’ outcome and at date 1 it chooses the amount of
labor l = (lg, lb) to hire when the technology is realized. Since the firm is not infinitesimal
(see Section 2.5 for a discussion of that case) the spot prices (ws, ps) depend on its outcome,
and we assume that the firm recognizes that it has “market impact”. If at date 1 the firm
acts strategically in its choice of labor (output) knowing the elasticities of the demand for its
product and the supply of labor, then we say that it exploits its “market power” on the spot
markets. If it makes its choice of labor taking prices as given, then we say it acts competitively
on the spot markets. There are two potential sources of inefficiency in the model, one, that we
exhibit below, arising from the choice of investment, the other arising from monopoly/oligopoly
pricing on the spot markets. The first is new, the second familiar. For the purpose of theory
it is useful to distinguish the two imperfections, and our model permits the distinction to be
made. In this section we assume that firm 1 behaves competitively on the spot market and
chooses its labor ls in each outcome to maximize its profit Rs(ls;ws, ps) = psfs(ls) − wsls,
taking the spot prices (ws, ps) as given. In Section 3 we discuss what happens when firms also
exert their market power through prices as well as investment decisions.
Assuming that the firm correctly anticipates the spot prices and its future labor decision,
it chooses the probability pi at date 0 to maximize the (net) present value of profit, which in
this case is just the discounted expected profit net of the investment cost since agents are risk
neutral. Firm 1’s combined choice problem amounts to choosing (pi, l) to maximize its value
for the shareholders, which we denote by SV:
SV (pi, l;w, p) =
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
Rs(ls;ws, ps)− γ(pi). (7)
In the same way firm 2 , which has no date 0 investment decision, maximizes its value for the
shareholders
ŜV (lˆ;w, p) =
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
Rˆ(lˆs;ws, ps), (8)
by choosing lˆs at date 1 which maximizes its profit Rˆ(lˆs;ws, ps) = psfˆ(lˆs)− ws lˆs.
The three groups of agents trade on the spot and financial markets and have sequential
budget equations at date 0 and in each outcome at date 1 of the form
mi0 = e
i
0 − 11+rzi − qθi − qˆθˆi + ξi
mis = e
i
s + z
i +Rsθ
i + Rˆsθˆ
i + ws`
i
s − pscis, s = g, b
(9)
where zi is the bond holding and θi, θˆi are the ownership shares of the firms purchased by
agent i . Finally
• ξi = 0, if i = w, c, ξi = [q − γ(pi)]θi0 + qˆθˆi0 if i = k
• cis = 0, if i = w, k, cis = cs if i = c
• `is = 0, if i = c, k, `is = `s if i = w,
(10)
where θi0 and θˆ
i
0 denote the initial shareholdings of capitalist i (these sum to one across i and
cannot both be positive since the firms are owned by distinct subsets of individuals). The
owners of firm 1 finance the cost γ(pi) proportionally to their (initial) shares of firm 1 and
all capitalists get income from the sale of their initial shareholdings ξi = [q − γ(pi)]θi0 + qˆθˆi0.
While shareholders are assumed to finance the investment of firm 1, any mode of financing,
whether by debt or by issuing new shares, would lead to the same equilibrium in view of the
Modigliani-Miller theorem. Only the consumers purchase the produced good (ccs = cs) and
only workers sell their labor services (`ws = `s). All agents are assumed to know firm 1’s choice
of pi at date 0 and to correctly anticipate future spot prices and the firms’ profits Rs and Rˆs
in each outcome s at date 1.
Given the linearity of the agents’ preferences in the numeraire composite commodity, the
first-order conditions for the optimal choice of bond and equity holdings imply
1
1 + r
= δ, q = δ
∑
s=g,b
pisRs =
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
Rs, qˆ =
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
Rˆs (11)
so that pricing is risk neutral. Since financial markets are complete, the sequential budget
constraints (9) are equivalent to the single intertemporal (present value) budget constraint
mi0 +
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
mis = e
i
0 +
ei1
1 + r
+ ξi +
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
(ws`
i
s − pscis), i = w, c, k (12)
where (ξi, ci, `i) are given by (10). In view of the linearity of the agents’ preferences in mi =
(mi0,m
i
g,m
i
b) any m
i satisfying (12) is equivalent for agent i, and when the budget constraint
(12) is satisfied, the utility of agent i is
• ew0 +
ew1
1 + r
+
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
(ws`s − v(`s)) for a worker (a)
• ec0 +
ec1
1 + r
+
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
(u(cs)− pscs) for a consumer (b)
• ek0 +
ek1
1 + r
+ [q − γ(pi)]θi0 + qˆθˆi0 for a capitalist (c)
(13)
Thus a worker will choose ` to maximize 13(a), a consumer will choose c to maximize 13(b)
and a capitalist has no other choice than to spend his income on the composite good. If he is
among the owners of firm 1 (θˆi0 = 0) then his utility is maximized when firm 1 maximizes its
shareholder value SV = q − γ(pi), and if he is among the owners of firm 2 (θi0 = 0) then his
utility is maximized when firm 2 maximizes its shareholder value ŜV = qˆ.8
Summing the budget equations (12), assuming that (10) holds, gives∑
i=w,c,k
mi0 +
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
mis = e0 +
e1
1 + r
+ q + qˆ − γ(pi) +
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
(−pscs + ws`s)
If the markets clear for the produced good (cs = fs(ls) + fˆ(lˆs)) and labor (`s = ls + lˆs) then in
view of (11) the terms involving the firm’s market value cancel out, giving∑
i=w,c,k
mi0 +
∑
s=g,b
pis
1 + r
mis = e0 +
e1
1 + r
− γ(pi).
8Our assumption that the two firms are owned by distinct subsets of shareholders simplifies the analysis. It
implies that each firm maximizes its own shareholder value. Our results would still hold for different ownership
structures but the investment choice of firm one would have to take into account the externalities it exerts on
firm two.
Given the indeterminacy in the choice of mi, we can assume that when agents choose mi to
satisfy (12) they in addition choose money holdings such that∑
i=w,c,k
mi0 + γ(pi) = e0,
∑
i=w,c,k
mis = e1, s = g, b (14)
so that the market for the composite good clears at date 0 and in each outcome s at date 1.
Since our objective is to compare the consumption, labor and investment choices which
arise in a market equilibrium with those at the social optimum, we focus directly on a succinct
reduced-form definition of an equilibrium involving these three choices. From this reduced-form
equilibrium a complete description of the equilibrium on the spot markets for the produced
good, money and labor, and on the financial markets for the bond and equity can readily be
reconstructed using (9)-(11) and (14).
Definition 1. A (reduced-form) shareholder equilibrium of the economy E is a vector of actions
and prices
(
(¯`, c¯, pi, l¯,
¯ˆ
l), (w¯, p¯)
)
such that
(i) the labor choice ¯`= (¯`g, ¯`b) ≥ 0 maximizes worker’s utility 13(a) given w¯;
(ii) the consumption choice c¯ = (c¯g, c¯b) ≥ 0 maximizes consumer’s utility 13(b) given p¯;
(iii) firm 1’s production plan (pi, l¯) = (pi, l¯g, l¯b) ≥ 0 maximizes shareholder value (7) given
(w¯, p¯) ;
(iv) firm 2’s production plan (
¯ˆ
l) = (
¯ˆ
lg,
¯ˆ
lb) ≥ 0 maximizes shareholder value (8) given (w¯, p¯) ;
(v) the markets clear: ¯`s = l¯s +
¯ˆ
ls, c¯s = fs(l¯s) + fˆ(
¯ˆ
ls), s = g, b.
Let us compare the FOCs for the maximum problems (i)-(iv) of a shareholder equilibrium
with the FOCs for a Pareto optimum. In a shareholder equilibrium the optimal labor choice ¯`
for the workers satisfies
v′(¯`s) = w¯s, s = g, b (15)
and the consumers’ optimal choice c¯ satisfies
u′(c¯s) = p¯s, s = g, b (16)
while the firm’s profit-maximizing choices of labor (l¯,
¯ˆ
l) imply that for each outcome at date 1
the real wage equals the marginal product of labor
p¯sf
′
s(l¯s) = w¯s, p¯sfˆ
′(¯ˆls) = w¯s s = g, b. (17)
Using (15), (16) to eliminate spot prices and adding the market clearing condition (v) gives
the equations, for s = g, b :
u′(c¯s)f ′s(l¯s) = u
′(c¯s)fˆ ′(
¯ˆ
ls) = v
′(¯`s), c¯s = f(l¯s) + fˆ(
¯ˆ
l), ¯`s = l¯s +
¯ˆ
ls, (18)
which characterize the spot market equilibrium at date 1. Since (18) is identical to (5), which
characterizes the maximum of the social welfare, the choice of labor in equilibrium is optimal
and
(c¯, ¯`, l¯,
¯ˆ
l) = (c∗, `∗, l∗, lˆ∗).
The remaining first-order condition for the choice of investment p¯i which maximizes share-
holder value (7) is
1
1 + r
(
R¯g − R¯b
)
= γ′(pi) if R¯g > R¯b, pi = 0 otherwise, (19)
where R¯s is the maximized profit of firm 1 in outcome s: this equation has a unique solution
since γ′(pi) increases from 0 to∞. Comparing (19) with (6) we see that if W ∗g −W ∗b > R¯g− R¯b
then p¯i < pi∗ since γ′ is increasing: the profit criterion underestimates the social gain from
obtaining the technology fg rather than the technology fb.
Proposition 1. There is under-investment in the shareholder equilibrium: pi< pi∗.
Proof: Lemma 1 in the Appendix proves the property W ∗g −W ∗b > R¯g − R¯b, from which the
result follows.
The proof is based on the simple intuition of what happens when the technology of firm 1
moves from its ‘bad’ technology to its ‘good’ technology. A first consequence of this move is
that labor moves out of firm 2, but the increased productivity of firm 1 may lead to either an
increase or a decrease in its demand for labor. Thus the total labor employed by the two firms
(and hence the wage) may either increase or decrease. It is easy to deduce from the the proof
of Lemma 1 in the Appendix that, when moving from state b to state g:
(i) the sum of the surpluses of consumers of firms 1 and 2 increases
(ii) the sum of the surpluses of workers of firms 1 and 2 may increase9 or decrease, depending
on the curvatures of the functions (u, v, fg, fb, fˆ)
(iii) the profit of firm 2 decreases: improving the competitor’s technology hurts the share-
holders of firm 2.
For s = g, b, the difference W ∗s − R¯s is the sum of the surpluses in (i)-(iii). The surprising
part of the proof of Lemma 1 is that despite the ambiguity of the sign of (ii) and the negative
sign of (iii), the sum of these surpluses increases in moving from b to g: W ∗b − R¯b < W ∗g − R¯g.
By the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, even though there may be some losers from the improvement in
firm 1’s technology, the winners can compensate the losers. The difference [W ∗g −W ∗b ]−[R¯g−R¯b]
measures precisely the pecuniary externality created by firm 1’s investment at date 0.
The inefficiency of a shareholder equilibrium comes from the fact that firm 1’s investment
affects all agents in the economy, not just its shareholders. Since the welfare of the consumers,
9Workers are better off if total labor employed increases: this occurs when the elasticity of demand is
sufficiently small. In the extreme case where u is linear, the price of the output does not change (p¯g = p¯b) and
the consumers have no surplus: all improvement in technology goes to increasing the wages of the workers.
workers and shareholders of firm 2 is different in outcomes g and b, the choice of pi affects their
expected utilities. In a shareholder equilibrium firm 1 chooses its investment only taking into
account the effect on its expected profit (the welfare of its shareholders) and ignores the effect
of its investment on all other groups of agents: the profit criterion fails to “internalize” the
externality of its action on agents other than its shareholders.10
2.4 General Model with J Firms
The underinvestment result of Proposition 1 applies to a setting in which a dominant firm
(firm 1) operates on spot markets for labor and output in parallel with a competitive fringe
(represented by fˆ). We now extend this result to the more general setting where there are J
firms, each of which makes an investment choice relative to its risky technology. In the general
case where the J firms face different risks and have access to different technologies we can show,
by comparing first-order conditions, that a shareholder equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. But
the under-investment result of Proposition 1 is no longer always true. However when the firms
are sufficiently similar— in short when we appeal to symmetry—the under-investment result
can be extended to the case of J firms.
To keep notation simple we focus on the case where J = 2 and assume that the second
firm now has a technology that is exposed to risk: if it invests γˆ(pˆi) at date 0 it will use the
technology fˆg with probability pˆi and the technology fˆb with probability 1 − pˆi. We assume
in addition that (fˆg, fˆb) = (fg, fb) and γˆ(pˆi) = γ(pi) (the symmetry assumption). There are
now four possible outcomes s = (s1, s2), with s1 ∈ {g, b} and s2 ∈ {g, b}. We assume that the
risks to which the firms are exposed are independent so that the probability of the outcome
s = (s1, s2) is pis = pis1 pˆis2 . With this change in the definition of the outcome s, finding a Pareto
optimal allocation still consists in finding a solution to (2) subject to the resource constraint
(1) where firm 2’s production function is now indexed by s (fˆs = fˆg if s2 = g, fˆs = fˆb if s2 = b).
As in the benchmark model the analysis can be decomposed into two steps: the first consists
in finding the consumption-labor decision (c∗s, `∗s, l∗s , lˆ∗s) which maximizes the social welfare
Ws = u(cs)− v(`s) for each s ; the second consists in finding the optimal investments (pi∗, pˆi∗)
which maximize the expected discounted welfare net of the cost of investment. The solution
of the first problem is, as before, characterized by (5) where (fˆ , fˆ ′) is replaced by (fˆs, fˆ ′s) . On
the other hand the first-order conditions for the two firms socially optimal investment choices
(pi∗, pˆi∗) are now characterized by the pair of equations
(W ∗gg −W ∗bg)pˆi∗ + (W ∗gb −W ∗bb)(1− pˆi∗) = 1δγ′(pi∗)
(W ∗gg −W ∗gb)pi∗ + (W ∗bg −W ∗bb)(1− pi∗) = 1δ γˆ′(pˆi∗)
(20)
where W ∗s denotes the optimized social welfare in outcome s ∈ S. (20) is the generalization
of (6) to the case where both firms make investment decisions at date 0. When the two firms
10The inefficiency result does not rely on the assumption of quasi-linear preferences. This assumption just
allows a much simpler analysis of consumer and employee surplus when we analyse the stakeholder model. The
generic inefficiency result in the general case with wealth effects is in Magill and Quinzii (2009). Basically, they
show that the first order conditions characterizing the equilibrium behavior of shareholder value maximizing
firms are distinct from the ones that characterize Pareto Optimality. This is much easier to see in the quasi-linear
case, but is true more generally.
have the same risks and the same technology, the first-order condition for the symmetric Pareto
optimal investment pi∗ reduces to the single equation
(W ∗gg −W ∗bg)pi∗ + (W ∗gb −W ∗bb)(1− pi∗) =
1
δ
γ′(pi∗). (21)
The increments in social welfare have the following intuitive submodularity property which
serves to establish the uniqueness of the symmetric Pareto optimum.
Lemma 2 W ∗gb −W ∗bb > W ∗gg −W ∗bg > 0.
Lemma 2, whose proof is given in the Appendix, asserts that the increment in social welfare
when firm 1 has a good rather than a bad outcome is greater when the other firm has the
outcome “b” rather than “g”, since firm 1 adds its production to the smaller production by
firm 2. The existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Pareto optimum follows at once by noting
that the function
φ(pi) = (W ∗gg −W ∗bg)pi + (W ∗gb −W ∗bb)(1− pi)−
1
δ
γ′(pi)
satisfies φ(0) > 0, φ(pi) → −∞ as pi → 1, and φ′(pi) < 0 by Lemma 2 and γ′′ > 0. Since φ is
continuous there is a unique pi∗ satisfying φ(pi∗) = 0.
The concept of a (reduced-form) shareholder equilibrium (Definition 1) extends in an nat-
ural way to this new setting where both firms have risks: the maximum problem of firm 2 ((iv)
in Definition 1) now involves choosing a probability pˆi at date 0 and a production plan in each
outcome s ∈ S at date 1. As before profit maximization and optimal choices of consumers and
workers on spot markets at date 1 lead to an optimal consumption-labor allocation for each
outcome s ∈ S. The first-order conditions for the optimal choices of investment (p¯i, ¯ˆpi) by the
firms which maximize shareholder values are given by
(R¯1gg − R¯1bg)¯ˆpi + (R¯1gb − R¯1bb)(1− ¯ˆpi) ≤ 1δγ′(p¯i), = if p¯i > 0
(R¯2gg − R¯2gb)p¯i + (R¯2bg − R¯2bb)(1− p¯i) ≤ 1δ γˆ′(¯ˆpi), = if ¯ˆpi > 0
(22)
where R¯1s and R¯
2
s denote the maximized profit of firms 1 and 2 given the spot prices (p¯s, w¯s).
(22) is the generalization of (19) to the setting were both firms make investment decisions at
date 0. At a symmetric equilibrium R¯1bg = R¯
2
gb, R¯
1
gg = R¯
2
gg, R¯
1
bb = R¯
2
bb so that the common
choice of investment, which for simplicity we still denote by p¯i, is characterized by the FOC
(R¯1gg − R¯1bg)p¯i + (R¯1gb − R¯1bb)(1− p¯i) ≤
1
δ
γ′(p¯i), = if p¯i > 0. (23)
Establishing a monotone ranking of the solutions of the first-order conditions (20) at a Pareto
optimum and at an equilibrium (22) in the general case11 is difficult: however when the firms
are similar the submodularity property makes it is possible to compare the solutions of (21)
and (23) and this leads to the following generalization of Proposition 1.
11Existence of a shareholder equilibrium is easy to establish under our assumption of two productive outcomes
per firm. For an existence result when there are more than two outcomes, see Magill and Quinzii (2009).
Proposition 2. In any symmetric shareholder equilibrium of an economy with J firms there
is under-investment: p¯i < pi∗.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 1 consisted in showing that W ∗g −W ∗b > R¯g − R¯b when firm
2 has a fixed technology. This implies that for any realization of the technology of firm 2
W ∗gs2 −W ∗bs2 > R¯1gs2 − R¯1bs2 , s2 = g, b (24)
We want to prove that p¯i < pi∗. Suppose by contradiction that p¯i ≥ pi∗. Since pi∗ is positive,
this implies that p¯i > 0, and thus that (23) holds with equality. Then γ′(p¯i) ≥ γ′(pi∗) and by
(21) and (23)
(R¯1gg − R¯1bg)p¯i + (R¯1gb − R¯1bb)(1− p¯i) ≥ (W ∗gg −W ∗gb)pi∗ + (W ∗bg −W ∗bb)(1− pi∗)
≥ (W ∗gg −W ∗gb)p¯i + (W ∗bg −W ∗bb)(1− p¯i)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2: the convex combination with weights (p¯i,
1 − p¯i) puts less weight on the larger term (W ∗bg − W ∗bb) than the convex combination with
weights (pi∗, 1 − pi∗). The resulting inequality between expected profit and expected welfare
increments contradicts (24): thus p¯i < pi∗. The proof is readily extended to the case J > 2 and
is left to the reader. 2
2.5 Continuum of Firms
There is a way of changing the structure of our economy to obtain an equilibrium with profit-
maximizing firms which is Pareto optimal: it suffices to replace the finite set of J firms by a
continuum of firms.12 More precisely, consider a modified economy with a continuum of ex-ante
identical firms, where each firm makes an investment at date 0 which influences the probability
of its outcome fg or fb at date 1. If each firm’s outcome is independent of the outcomes of the
other firms and all firms choose the same probability pi, then by an (appropriate variant) of
the Law of Large Numbers a proportion pi of firms will produce with fg, a proportion 1−pi will
produce with fb, and the average output produced and the spot prices will be non random. It
is easy to show that a symmetric shareholder equilibrium exists in which each firm’s investment
maximizes the present value of its profit and the equilibrium investment is Pareto optimal (see
the Internet Appendix).
However in this modified model, which is elegant and well behaved from a theoretical point
of view, a firm has been transformed into an infinitesimal entity, far removed from the large
corporate firm that we seek to model: the infinitesimal firms that populate this economy aptly
fit what Berle and Means (1932) in their classic study described as the small sole proprietorships
originally envisaged by Adam Smith. As they argued with great clarity, such firms have little
or nothing in common with the large corporate firms whose securities are traded on the stock
market and which, even in their day, had come to have a significant footprint on the economic
landscape.13
12Beginning with Prescott and Townsend (1984a and b) models with a continuum of firms have been widely
used to explore equilibria with moral hazard. See e.g. Bisin-Gottardi (1999), Lisboa (2001), Zame (2007) and
Acemoglu-Simsek (2010) for models of this type.
13“When Adam Smith talked of “enterprise” he had in mind as the typical unit the small individual firm in
3 Seeking Solutions to Inefficiency
Section 2 presented a model in which firms make investment decisions that influence the suc-
cess or failure of their future uncertain technologies. Propositions 1 and 2 asserted that if
investment is chosen to maximize profit then firms are led to underinvest: a firm’s investment
has an external effect which is not internalized by the profit criterion. One may wonder if
the externality is simply an artifact of the way the market equilibrium has been modeled.
The standard way of incorporating uncertainty in general equilibrium is to use the Arrow-
Debreu (AD) model with states of nature which are primitive causes whose probabilities are
exogenously given and are not influenced by the actions of economic agents. This is different
from the modeling of this paper where there is a fixed finite number of outcomes (g and b
for the benchmark model) whose probabilities are influenced by the firm’s investment. It is
this dependence that creates the externality on agents’ expected utilities.14 However in the
Arrow-Debreu model, since the probabilities of the states of nature are exogenous there is no
externality of a firm’s actions on agents’ expected utilities. Could the externality be removed
by replacing the shareholder equilibrium by the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of our economy?
3.1 Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium of Benchmark Economy
In the Internet Appendix we show how our benchmark model can be embedded in an Arrow-
Debreu model by introducing states of nature (ω ∈ Ω) and a production function F (ω, γ, l)
such that the set of states ω ∈ Ω for which F (ω, γ, l) = fg(l) has probability pig(γ) and the
set of states for which F (ω, γ, l) = fb(l) has probability pib(γ). We study the Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium of the economy and show that
(i) the assumption that firm 1 takes the prices of output and labor (p(ω), w(ω)) as given
in each state of nature (ω ∈ Ω) is incompatible with the assumption that the firm has
correct (rational) expectations;
(ii) an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium does not exist. This comes from the fact that modeling
the success/failure uncertainty using the state of nature approach leads to a non-convex
production set.
The intuition for these results is easy to obtain in the case where production does not
involve labor, i.e. when fg(l) = yg, fb(l) = yb, v(l) = 0 for all l ≥ 0. The only possible level of
investment at an AD equilibrium is the efficient level pi∗. However assuming that firm 1’s profit
is maximal at pi∗ leads to a contradiction. In the AD equilibrium the firm is assumed to act as if
the spot price was exogenously determined by the abstract state of nature ω and is independent
of its investment decision. If the firm considers a marginal increase ∆pi above pi∗, then its
outcome will be yg in some states where it is yb with pi
∗. The AD price-taking assumption is
that the price stays at pb in these states despite the fact that the supply of the consumption
good has changed by a non negligible amount. This is what we mean in (i) when we say that
which the owner perhaps with the aid of a few . . . workers, labored to produce goods for market. . . . These units
have been supplanted . . . by great aggregations in which tens or even hundreds of thousands of workers and
property . . . belonging to tens or even hundred of thousands of individuals are combined through the corporate
mechanism into a single producing organization under unified control”, Berle and Means (1932, pp.4 & 303).
14See Magill-Quinzii (2009) for a discussion of the two approaches.
the AD price taking assumption is incompatible with the assumption of correct expectations. It
turns out that this assumption also leads to the non-existence of an equilibrium. For the change
in investment entails an increase in expected discounted revenue of ∆R+ = δpb(yg − yb)∆pi. If
profit is maximum at pi∗, it must be that δpb(yg − yb) ≤ γ′∗), so that an increase in investment
does not increase the (expected discounted) profit. But then a marginal decrease ∆pi < 0 below
pi∗ will entail a decrease in discounted revenue ∆R− = δpg(yb − yg)(−∆pi). This decrease in
investment is worthwhile since pg < pb implies δpg(yg − yb) < δpb(yg − yb) ≤ γ′∗). Thus pi∗
can not maximize the discounted expected profit of firm 1 and an AD equilibrium does not
exist.15
The simple stochastic two-outcome (or more generally finite-outcome) economy falls into
the class of stochastic economies mentioned by Arrow (1971) for which no Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium exists due to the inherent non-convexity of the production set when translated to the
state-of-nature setting.16 And yet this success/failure type of uncertainty with the probability
of success influenced by some action on the part of the firm is a common and pervasive type of
uncertainty. To use the Arrow Debreu model in such a setting would require the assumption of
a continuum of firms to take advantage of the convexifying effect of large numbers. This would
solve problem (ii) above. It would also imply that all firms are negligible, solving problem (i)
but eliminating the very problem we want to study. In contrast the probability model and the
concept of a shareholder equilibrium presented in Section 2 are compatible with non-negligible
firms having market impact and permits the presence of market impact to be distinguished
from the use of market power. Factoring out market power on prices enables us to retain much
of the simplicity of the competitive model—in particular we can treat consumers and workers
symmetrically, which is difficult to do in traditional IO models.
3.2 Classical Remedies for Externalities
Since the externality cannot be removed by resorting to the concept of an Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium, let us return to the benchmark model and explore ways in which the inefficiency
exhibited in Propositions 1 and 2 can be alleviated. This externality is not standard. In the
classification of externalities suggested by Laffont (1989) it is of the type “firms on consumers
(and workers)” whereas the externality of the innovation literature is of the type “firms on
firms”. It goes through agents’s preferences, which explicitly depend on the probabilities pis
15Another illustration of the problems associated with using the concept of AD equilibrium in our context is
given by the entry model of Mankiw-Whinston (1986), which can be viewed as a particular case of our model.
The shareholder equilibrium concept is the same as the one used by Mankiw and Whinston: firms decide to
enter or not, based on the profit pi∗(N) they anticipate as a function of the number N of active firms, and of
the type of competition that prevails. If firms are price takers, we obtain the competitive entry model. The
equilibrium number of firms is the maximum number N∗ such that pi∗(N) exceeds the entry cost γ. In the AD
version, each firm would assume that the price is independent of the number of firms that enter, and would take
as given the equilibrium profit pi∗(N∗). Thus the AD equilibrium would only exist when γ is precisely equal to
pi∗(N∗) for some integer N∗. This is clearly non-generic.
16
. . . it is possible to set up formal mechanisms which under certain conditions will achieve an
optimal allocation of risk by competitive methods. However, the empirical validity of the conditions
for the optimal character of competitive allocation is considerably less likely to be fulfilled in the
case of uncertainty. (Arrow, 1971)
of productive outcomes, probabilities that are chosen by the firms. However it is akin to a
pecuniary externality17 since productive outcomes determine equilibrium prices and wages. The
common element with the innovation literature is that investment creates a positive externality
which is not internalized by standard profit maximizing behavior and typically leads to under-
investment. It is thus instructive to examine if the remedies proposed for attenuating the
externality in the IO/growth literature could help in our setting. The innovation literature
basically recommends two types of policy for increasing investment expenditure on research on
new technologies: first, assigning a patent to an innovating firm giving it a property right to its
innovation, and second, subsidizing research. Since in our model the success or failure of the
firm does not affect the technologies of other firms, there is no free-rider problem associated
with other firms copying the innovation without sharing the cost, so that a patent is not
applicable. However if we think of a patent as a formal device for encouraging firms to exploit
their market power to increase the profit they get from the innovation then it has an interesting
parallel with our model.
For if instead of earning the competitive profit on the spot markets firm 1 (in the benchmark
model) earns greater profit by exploiting its market power, then the higher profit may provide
a greater incentive to invest. This is certainly true in the case where the firm is a monopoly
(fˆ ≡ 0) and fb ≡ 0, fg > 0 since the difference in monopoly profit between the good and the bad
outcome (Rmg −0) is greater than the difference in competitive profit (R¯g−0) so that investment
is greater with monopoly profit in view of (19). However there is still under-investment since
the monopoly profit does not capture all the surplus. In the more general case where fˆ > 0
and fb > 0 it becomes harder to compare the difference in oligopoly and competitive profits,
with the additional difficulty that the oligopoly profit depends on the nature of the imperfect
competition that is assumed to take place between the firms on the spot market. What is sure
is that investment will not be optimal since generically W ∗g −W ∗b 6= Rνg −Rνb where ν denotes
the nature of the imperfect competition between the firms on the spot markets. Counting on
imperfect competition to alleviate the under-investment is not however a satisfactory way to
proceed, since the decrease in welfare on the spot markets may exceed the gain (when it exists)
from the increased investment. It would be better to find a way of simultaneously alleviating
the inefficiencies created by the externality and the imperfectly competitive pricing rather than
counting on one inefficiency to offset the other.
The other way of alleviating under-investment, advocated in the innovation/growth liter-
ature is to subsidize research. In our model subsidizing the investment expenditure γ of firm
1 and financing the subsidy with lump-sum taxes on the agents could resolve the inefficiency.
However the ”firm-specificity” of the investment makes it unlikely that this solution can be
implemented in practice. If we think of the investment as decreasing the probability of a “bad”
outcome, the expenses involved could consist of increasing the labor devoted to maintenance,
17However it is different from the two categories of pecuniary externalities that have been identified in the
literature. It does not rely on the spanning role of prices in incomplete markets like in Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1986), because preferences are quasi linear and risk sharing considerations are absent. It does
not rely either on the second category of pecuniary externalities, identified by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986)
where prices enter agents’s decisions problems beyond their budget constraints through information asymmetries.
Here the mechanism is different: a (non-negligible) firm’s investment decision affects prices in goods and labor
markets, and thus indirectly impacts the welfare of consumers and workers.
quality control, production control, or could consist of using more expensive inputs which make
it more likely to obtain a satisfactory output. It would be difficult for an outside agency to
distinguish these expenses from the ordinary expenses associated with production and to subsi-
dize them. In the same way expenses in management time to better organize the firm, and even
in research and development inside the firm to improve its production processes—all expenses
which make a “good” outcome more likely—would be difficult to separate from standard pro-
duction expenses. In the case of research with possible spillovers the subsidies take the form of
financing ‘fundamental research’ by the government in universities and government agencies.
The second stage of research which is carried out inside firms, to go from the basic research to
industrial applications is generally not subsidized,18 in large part because of the same problem
of non observability. To formalize this difficulty arising from the non-observability, which gives
rise to moral hazard problems when subsidies are involved, we can assume that the investment
γ(pi) of Firm 1, although observable by the shareholders, consumers and employees of the firm,
is not observable by an outside government agency.
4 Stakeholder Approach
In the previous section we argued that the remedies proposed in the innovation literature for
solving the externality problem do not seem appropriate for solving the problem of underinvest-
ment in our setting. Three approaches have been proposed for correcting inefficiencies created
by the presence of externalities:19 (i) outside intervention either by government (through reg-
ulation or Pigouvian taxes/subsidies) or by the judicial system (in the form of civil tort laws
implemented by courts); (ii) internal solutions such as mergers (integration of all the parties
involved in the externality); (iii) market solutions, for example by creating Coasian securities
i.e. tradeable property rights associated with the externality (Coase, 1960). Although (i) may
be appropriate in some settings,20 since in our model the externality principally affects agents
directly related to the operations of the firm—its consumers, its workers and its shareholders—
who are de facto natural stakeholders, it seems worthwhile to explore an “internal solution” in
which the firm merges the interests of all its stakeholders.
The idea that a large corporation should take into account the interests of all its stakeholders
is not new, but has mainly been discussed outside the economic literature—with the notable
exception of Tirole (2001, 2006).21 As Tirole (2001) makes clear, it has not been precisely
articulated in the framework of a formalized model and this may serve to explain why it
has not been extensively discussed in the economic literature. Let us explore how our model
18It is at this point that the patent system typically takes over from subsidization.
19See for example the discussion in Laffont (1989).
20For example, Blanchard-Tirole (2001) propose introducing a tax on workers’ layoffs aimed at inducing firms
to internalize the externalities inflicted on laid-off workers. In their model the externality comes from frictions
in the labor market.
21Tirole (2001) defines corporate governance “as the design of institutions that induce or force management
to internalize the welfare of stakeholders...” in order to internalize a broad array of externalities. We do not seek
to develop a theory encompassing all types of externalities that can be created by large firms: our contribution
is rather to identify a new form of externality that seems to have been overlooked, and to suggest ways to correct
it. Such an externality exists as soon as a firm is non-negligible and takes actions that influence the probability
of its outcomes, even without any frictions in labor and consumption markets.
suggests formalizing a stakeholder theory and whether such an approach can restore efficiency.
4.1 Single Firm: Stakeholder Equilibrium
We begin with the simplest version of the benchmark model (fs, fˆ) in which fˆ = 0, i.e. there
is a single firm which makes an investment a date 0 and uses labor to produce output at date
1. Let ((p¯i, l¯), (w¯, p¯)) denote the shareholder equilibrium in this case. We saw that l¯s = l
∗
s ,
where l∗s is the labor choice which maximizes the social welfare W ∗s = maxl≥0{u(fs(ls))−v(ls)}:
spot markets allocate labor efficiently in each outcome s at date 1 and the social welfare in
equilibrium W s is the maximum welfare W
∗
s . The inefficiency comes from the investment
choice p¯i at date 0 which is characterized by the FOC for profit maximization
1
1 + r
(Rg −Rb) = γ′(p¯i)
whereas the socially optimal investment pi∗ is characterized by
1
1 + r
(W g −W b) = γ′(pi∗)
Given spot prices (ws, ps) the consumer and worker surpluses are defined by
CSs(ps) = max
cs≥0
{u(cs)− pscs} WSs(ws) = max
`s≥0
{ws`s − v(`s)} (25)
Since u(0) = 0 and v(0) = 0, CSs(ps) is the net gain in utility for the representative consumer
from being able to buy the good at price ps, while WSs(ws) is the net utility gain for the
representative worker from being able to sell labor at the wage ws. When, as in the shareholder
equilibrium, agents trade on spot markets at prices (w¯s, p¯s) and markets clear (l¯s = ¯`s) the
social welfare in outcome s can be expressed as
Ws = u(c¯s)− v(¯`s) =
(
u(c¯s)− p¯sc¯s
)
+
(
w¯s ¯`s − v(¯`s)
)
+
(
p¯sfs(l¯s)− w¯s l¯s
)
= CSs +WSs +Rs
namely as the sum of consumer surplus, worker surplus, and shareholder profit. As we saw
in Proposition 1 the inefficiency of investment in a shareholder equilibrium comes from the
property that W g − W b > Rg − Rb. The difference comes from the sum of the two terms
CSg−CSb and WSg−WSb, the difference in consumer and worker surplus between the good
and the bad outcome, which measures precisely the external effect which is not internalized by
the firm when it uses the present value of profit as its criterion for the choice of investment.
Thus to obtain a stakeholder criterion for the firm which ensures that the effect of its investment
decision is fully internalized, the firm needs to take into account not only its shareholders but
also the consumers it serves and the workers it employs since these latter two parties also gain
from having the good rather than the bad outcome.
Proposition 4. Consider the case with only one active firm. If in the concept of equilibrium
we replace the criterion of maximizing shareholder value by maximizing the total surplus of
the stakeholders
1
1 + r
∑
s=g,b
pis
(
CS(p¯s) +WS(w¯s) +Rs(w¯s, p¯s)
)
− γ(pi) (26)
then we obtain a stakeholder equilibrium ((pi∗, l¯), (w¯, p¯)) which is Pareto optimal.
Another important consequence arises from the adoption of the total surplus criterion
(26): the assumption that the equilibrium prices on the spot market are the “competitive”
prices (w¯s, p¯s), s = g, b is no longer needed—it is a byproduct of the criterion. A monopoly
maximizing the total surplus will choose ls = l
∗
s since this maximizes the surplus in outcome
s—a necessary condition for maximizing expected total surplus (26)—and thus will set the
prices at (w¯s, p¯s), s = g, b. When the welfare of all stakeholders is taken into account there
is no reason to exploit the elasticity of demand for the product or of the supply of labor to
increase the profit of the shareholders. Thus in the monopoly case the stakeholder criterion
solves both the problem of “market power” and the problem of “market impact”.
4.2 Coasian Approach
Although criterion (26) provides a precise definition of the stakeholders’ interests, it does
not guarantee that the criterion can or will be used as the basis of decision making by the
firm’s manager: ways of measuring the “surpluses” CS and WS, as well as incentives for the
management to maximize (26), must also exist. Thus the implementation of a stakeholder
equilibrium raises three issues22:
• Incentives: incentives must be given to the firm’s manager to apply the stakeholder
criterion.
• Information : to apply the stakeholder criterion the manager needs information on the
characteristics of the consumers and workers to evaluate their surpluses.
• Financing : if the shareholder value at the stakeholder equilibrium is negative, an ad-
ditional source of funds beyond equity and debt must be found, since otherwise the
shareholders would dispose of their ownership shares rather than being forced to finance
a project with a negative net present value.
Since markets are typically good at providing both incentives and information, can we
imagine a way to use markets that would provide the appropriate incentives and information
to maximize the sum of the surpluses in (26), leaving aside for the moment the problem of
financing? In the spirit of Coase (1960) we introduce the idea that creating explicit tradeable
property rights associated with the externalities created by the firm may provide the extension
of the markets required to implement a stakeholder equilibrium.23
22See Tirole (2001) for a discussion of these issues.
23When all agents are identical and simultaneously consumers, workers and shareholders, the externalities
can be internalized by giving identical equity shares to all agents, since they will all agree that the firm should
maximize the welfare of the representative agent as in Morgan-Tumlinson (2012). In our model where consumers,
workers and shareholders have different preferences, there is no way of distributing equity shares among the
agents that leads to the Pareto optimal investment. In a model with imperfect competition and two distinct
Suppose therefore that at date 0, in addition to the market for equity on which ownership
shares are traded, there is a market for “consumer rights”—or more briefly c-rights—on which
agents exchange the right to buy the good produced by the firm at date 1 at the spot price
p = (pg, pb). In addition there is a market for “worker rights”—or more briefly w-rights—on
which agents exchange the right to sell labor to the firm at date 1 at the spot price w = (wg, wb).
Suppose every consumer has an endowment of one c-right and every worker as an endowment
of one w-right. To understand how the market values these rights we need to create some
scarcity by assuming that only a mass 1− ε of consumers and workers is endowed with rights
and then let ε go to zero.
A worker with no initial w-right who observes the investment decision γ(pi) and anticipates
a date 1 wage w = (wg, wb) would be willing to pay up to
WV (pi,w) = δ[piWSg(wg) + (1− pi)WSb(wb)] (27)
to obtain the right to work for the firm, where WS(ws) defined by (25) is the surplus utility
that a worker derives from selling labor at the wage ws: WV (pi,w) is the date 0 “worker value”
of being employed by the firm. A worker who owns a w-right will accept to sell it if its price is
equal to or exceeds (27). Thus if ε > 0, equilibrium on the market for w-rights occurs at the
price
qw(pi,w) = WV (pi,w) (28)
If ε = 0 and every worker is endowed with a w-right, then no worker needs to buy a right,
so that any price between 0 and qw(pi,w) (at which every worker wants to keep the initial
w-right) is an equilibrium price. To retain the symmetry of the model we assume that every
worker is endowed with a w-right and that the market price of a w-right is given by (28), since
any scarcity, no matter how small, will immediately force the price to qw(pi,w). By a similar
argument, the market price qc(pi, p) of a c-right is taken to be the discounted expected surplus
utility derived by a consumer from buying the produced good at price p from the firm, namely
the “consumer value” CV (pi, p)
qc(pi, p) = CV (pi, p) = δ
(
piCSg(pg) + (1− pi)CSb(pb)
)
(29)
With the market valuations (28) and (29) in hand we now have a way of implementing a
stakeholder equilibrium. If the firm’s manager chooses labor at date 1 and the probability pi
at date 0 to maximize the total market value of the rights of its stakeholders,net of the cost of
investment
qw(pi, wˆ) + qc(pi, pˆ) + qe(pi, wˆ, pˆ)− γ(pi). (30)
Then the firm’s criterion for choosing investment coincides with the total surplus criterion (26)
of a stakeholder equilibrium and leads to the socially optimal investment decision pi∗.
The advantage of having an explicit market for w-rights and c-rights in addition to equity
is that the firm’s manager maximizes an objective, observable market value rather than an
classes of agents Demichelis and Ritzberger (2011) show that efficient pricing decisions can be obtained if agents
trade equity shares strategically, being aware that their ability to influence the firm’s decision depends on the
magnitude of their ownership share.
unobservable surplus. However to provide the manager with the incentive to maximize the
stakeholder value (30), workers and consumers must be able to influence the investment decision
of the firm. Thus when w-rights and c-rights are issued by the firm, the owners of these rights
acquire legal voting rights in the decision making process for investment. If unanimity is
required to approve a change of management, then the management will maximize the net
stakeholder value (30) or be replaced: for if a manager fails to maximize (30), a “raider”
could choose an investment with a higher stakeholder value and in the process transfer enough
value to workers, consumers and shareholders to buy their votes. In addition to providing
the manager with incentives to apply the stakeholder criterion, the existence of markets for
w-rights and c-rights provides the required information on the worker and consumer surpluses:
knowledge of the price functions qw(pi, wˆ) and qc(pi, pˆ), which may be acquired from repeated
observations of market prices, is sufficient information to be able to maximize the total surplus
in the economy.24
In the above analysis we assumed that the w-rights and c-rights had already been issued.
Thus neither consumers nor workers contribute to the funding of the firm’ s investment which
must be paid by the shareholders, either directly as assumed in Section 2, or indirectly through
the issue of bonds, which is equivalent. Such financing is possible only if qe(pi
∗, wˆ, pˆ) ≥ γ(pi∗).
Otherwise the shareholders will prefer to dispose of their equity shares rather than finance a
project with a negative net present value. If qe(pi
∗, wˆ, pˆ) < γ(pi∗), the stakeholder equilibrium
can still be implemented through stakeholder value maximization, provided that the model is
taken at the stage where the firm issues the rights. Since by assumption the optimal expected
total surplus is positive
pi∗W ∗g + (1− pi∗)W ∗b − γ(pi∗) > 0,
the net market value of these surpluses is positive
qw(pi
∗, wˆ) + qc(pi∗, pˆ) + qe(pi∗, wˆ, pˆ)− γ(pi∗) > 0. (31)
If the firm issues the rights and chooses pi∗ to maximize the market value of the rights plus
the net profit, then the proceeds qw(pi
∗, wˆ) + qc(pi∗, pˆ) from the sale of the rights is sufficient
to ensure that the shareholder value is positive since (31) can be written as
qe(pi
∗, wˆ, pˆ)−
(
γ(pi∗)− qw(pi∗, wˆ) + qc(pi∗, pˆ)
)
> 0
Thus the issue of rights can resolve the problem of financing when the net expected profit at
the optimal investment is negative.25
24The Internet Appendix to this paper contains an extension of our model that incorporates the possibility
of moral hazard on the part of the manager. It shows that, since the pledgeable income (in the sense of Tirole
(2001)) is reduced by the necessity of paying higher bonuses to the manager, the firm may have more difficulty
financing its investment, unless consumers and/or workers participate in the financing (see next footnote).
25This is corroborated by Michelacci and Quadrini (2005, 2009), who argue that employees sometimes par-
ticipate in the financing of their firms. They provide empirical evidence that some firms initially pay their
employees below the market wage and above market wages after some years. They interpret this finding along
the lines suggested here: credit constrained firms may find it optimal to borrow from their employees.
4.3 Multi-firm: Stakeholder Oriented Equilibrium
Let us see how the above analysis can be extended to the benchmark model (f, fˆ) with fˆ 6= 0,
where the firm that has the risky investment must compete with other firms on the labor and
product markets. This simple setting suffices to illustrate the difficulties with extending a
stakeholder theory to the multi-firm case.
To begin the analysis let us assume that each firm maximizes its profit on the spot markets
taking prices as given as in Section 2. The labor is allocated efficiently on the spot markets and
the efficient level of investment is obtained if firm 1 chooses pi to maximize the social welfare
δ(piW ∗g +(1−pi)W ∗b )−γ(pi) = δ(piW g+(1−pi)W b)−γ(pi), whereW s = u(fs(l¯s)+fˆ(¯ˆls))−v(l¯s+¯ˆls),
and where l¯s,
¯ˆ
ls are the profit maximizing choices of labor at the price p¯s = u
′(fs(l¯s) + fˆ(
¯ˆ
ls))
and wage w¯s = v
′(l¯s +
¯ˆ
ls). Using the notation y¯s = fs(l¯s) and ¯ˆys = fˆ(
¯ˆ
ls) the social welfare in
outcome s can be decomposed as
W s =
(
u(y¯s + ¯ˆys)− p¯s(y¯s + ¯ˆys)
)
+
(
w¯s(l¯s +
¯ˆ
ls)− v(l¯s + ¯ˆls)
)
+
(
p¯s(y¯s + ¯ˆys)− w¯s(l¯s + ¯ˆls)
)
= CSs +WSs +Rs + Rˆs,
where the surplus terms can be further decomposed as
CSs =
(
[u(y¯s + ¯ˆys)− u(¯ˆys)]− p¯sy¯s
)
+
(
u(¯ˆys)− p¯s ¯ˆys
)
WSs =
(
w¯s l¯s − [v(l¯s + ¯ˆls)− v(¯ˆls)]
)
+
(
w¯s
¯ˆ
ls − v(¯ˆls)
)
.
That is, the surplus of consumers and workers can be decomposed into the surplus created by
firm 1 (first bracketed terms in the above formulas) and the additional surplus attributable to
firm 2 (second bracketed terms.
To be an “ideal” stakeholder firm, firm 1 would need to choose investment to maximize
δ
∑
s pis(CSs+WSs+Rs+Rˆs)−γ(pis): this requires taking into account not only the difference
between the good and the bad outcome for the profit of its shareholders and the surplus it
generates for its consumers and workers, but also for the consumer and worker surpluses created
by the other firms, as well as the profit of the other firms’ shareholders. This is indeed an
encompassing vision of who the stakeholders of the firm are, which is difficult to reconcile with
competition between firms on the product and labor markets.
Realistically the most that can be expected of a corporation is that it take into account
the interests of its own stakeholders—its shareholders, the consumers it serves and the workers
it employs. Building on the notion of “value” of firm 1 for consumers and workers which we
introduced in section 4.2, we can define the consumer and worker values
CVs(ys, yˆs, ps) = u(ys + yˆs)− u(yˆs)− psys
WVs(ls, lˆs, ws) = wsls − [v(ls + lˆs)− v(lˆs)]
(32)
CVs and WVs are the money equivalent of the increase in utility attributable to the ability to
buy from firm 1 for the consumers, and to work for firm 1 for the workers, taking the decisions
of other firms as given. The consumer and worker values are firm 1’s contribution to the total
consumer and worker surpluses—but are not equal to the total surpluses.
It is difficult to describe a market structure on which these values are elicited using a model
where the two firms produce a homogeneous good. The value CVs needs to be understood as the
limit of the price of a c-right in a model with differentiated goods, when the goods become very
close substitutes. If the goods produced by firm 1 and 2 were differentiated, the representative
consumer would be willing to pay u(ys, yˆs) − u(0, yˆs) − psys for the right to buy from firm 1,
when the other firm produces yˆs (per capita) and ps is the price of good sold by firm 1. A
model with differentiated goods is certainly natural for large firms, but outside the scope of
this paper. We thus study the property of a stakeholder value equilibrium in which firm 1’s
manager is instructed to maximize the total value that the firm creates for its stakeholders,
leaving the study of the implementation of the equilibrium for further research.
Note that we no longer need to assume that firm 1 maximizes its profit on the spot markets
taking prices as given. To see this, assume as before that fˆ represents a competitive fringe,
that is fˆ(lˆ) = max{∑nj=1 fˆ j(lˆj) | ∑j lˆj = lˆ} where n is large, so that for the firms j = 1, . . . , n
the competitive assumption is (approximately) satisfied. On the other hand firm 1 chooses
(ls, ys) so as to maximize the total value for its stakeholders[
u(ys + yˆs)− u(yˆs)− psys
]
+
[
wsls − [v(ls + lˆs)− v(lˆs)
]
+
[
psys − wsls
]
under the constraints ys = f(ls), ps = u
′(ys + yˆs), ws = v′(ls + lˆs), taking (lˆs, yˆs) as given.
The terms involving prices in the objective function cancels (the revenue is a transfer from
consumer to shareholders and the wages a transfer from shareholders to workers) and the
first-order condition for the optimal choice of labor satisfies
u′(f(ls) + yˆs)f ′(ls) = v′(ls + lˆs)
Since the other firm maximizes its profit taking prices as given, the first-order conditions (5)
for a maximum of social welfare in outcome s are satisfied, so that the property that the spot
equilibrium prices are the competitive prices is no longer an assumption but follows from the
maximization of the stakeholder value criterion. Alternatively we could assume that firm 2 is
a large firm which maximizes a stakeholder criterion and it would also follow that the prices
on the spot markets are the competitive prices.
Definition 3. A stakeholder equilibrium of the economy E is a pair of actions and prices(
(¯`, c¯, pistv, l¯,
¯ˆ
l), (w¯, p¯)
)
such that (i), (ii), (iv),(v) of Definition 1 hold, and (iii) is replaced by
(iii′) (l¯, pistv, p¯, w¯) maximize the total value of firm 1 net of the investment cost
TV (w, p) =
1
1 + r
∑
s=g,b
(
CVs(ys, ps) +WVs(ls, ws) +R(ls, ws, ps)
)
− γ(pi)
under the constraints ys = f(ls), ps = u
′(ys + ¯ˆys), ws = v′(ls +
¯ˆ
ls).
In this definition we have kept the interpretation of firm 2 as a competitive fringe. As we
discussed above, the spot prices and the labor allocation is the same as in the shareholder
equilibrium. However the change in the criterion for firm 1 changes the FOC for the choice of
investment which becomes
1
1 + r
[(
CV g − CV b
)
+
(
WV g −WV b
)
+
(
Rg −Rb
)]
= γ′stv)
where the values are calculated at the spot market equilibrium. Adding the difference in
consumer and worker values between the good and bad outcomes to the difference in profit,
which is taken into account in the shareholder equilibrium, increases the perceived benefit by
firm 1 to achieving a good outcome, thus leading to an increase in investment. To compare
pistv with the optimal investment pi∗, note that
TV s = u(y¯s + ¯ˆys)− u(¯ˆys)− p¯sy¯s + w¯s l¯s − (v(l¯s + ¯ˆls)− v(¯ˆls)) + p¯sy¯s − w¯s l¯s
so that
TV s = W s − Ŵs, where Ŵs = u(¯ˆys)− v(¯ˆls).
Ŵs is the social welfare that can be attributed to firm 2 in the thought experiment in which
firm 1 is absent from the market, and the total value of firm 1 is the difference between the
total social welfare and that attributable to firm 2. The FOC for optimal investment in a
stakeholder value equilibrium is
1
1 + r
[(
W g −W b
)
−
(
Ŵg − Ŵb
)]
= γ′stv) (33)
while pi∗ is defined by 11+r
(
W g−W b
)
= γ
′
(pi∗). It is intuitive that firm 2 will “fill in” for firm
1 when firm 1 has a bad outcome: as a result firm 2 should produce more and create more
surplus in outcome b than in outcome g. Let us show that this is indeed the case, so that (33)
implies that there is over-investment at a stakeholder value equilibrium
Proposition 5. In a stakeholder equilibrium of the benchmark model (f, fˆ) with fˆ 6= 0 there
is over-investment: pistv > pi∗.
Proof: In view of (33) it remains to show that Ŵg < Ŵb. Firm 2’s surplus function Ŵ (lˆ) ≡
u(fˆ(lˆ))− v(lˆ) is concave, satisfies Ŵ (0) = 0 and has a maximum for lˆm defined by
Ŵ ′(lˆm) = u′(fˆ(lˆm))fˆ ′(lˆm)− v′(lˆm) = 0
For lˆ < lˆm, Ŵ (lˆ) is increasing. Thus if we show that (i) lˆg < lˆb and (ii) lˆb ≤ lˆm, then it follows
that Ŵg < Ŵb. (i) can be deduced from Lemma 3, which is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 3. lˆg < lˆb.
To show (ii) first suppose that fb ≡ 0, i.e. in the bad outcome firm 1 and does not produce.
Then firm 2 is the only producer on the market and, assuming price taking behavior, chooses
¯ˆ
lb so that p¯bfˆ
′(¯ˆlb) = w¯b. Since p¯b = u′(fˆ(
¯ˆ
lb)) and w¯b = v
′(¯ˆlb) it follows that u′(fˆ(
¯ˆ
lb))fˆ
′(¯ˆlb) −
v′(¯ˆlb) = 0, so that
¯ˆ
lb = lˆ
m. Since, by Lemma 3, lˆg < lˆb, it follows that Ŵg < Ŵb. To extend the
result to the case where fb > 0, consider a related economy E˜ for which f˜g = fb and f˜b ≡ 0.
Applying the above reasoning to E˜ , we find ˜ˆlb = lˆm and ˜ˆlg = ¯ˆlb < lˆm. 2
The stakeholder value criterion asks firm 1 to bear in mind the increased surplus that will
accrue to its workers and consumers if it succeeds in obtaining the good outcome. However the
optic that the criterion induces fails to take into account the response of firm 2. When firm
1 has a good outcome, firm 2 faces stiffer competition and a lower output price and produces
less than in outcome b, thereby creating a smaller surplus. Since the surpluses of the two
firms move in opposite directions, an investment decision based solely on the surplus created
by firm 1 exaggerates the gain in outcome g and leads to over-investment. Thus Proposition 1
asserts that pure profit underestimates the benefit of investment, while Proposition 5 asserts
that surplus value overestimates it. In the next proposition we show that a firm that gives a
(small) positive weight to its consumers and workers (on top of its shareholders) improves on
the shareholder equilibrium.
We say that firm 1 is stakeholder oriented if it maximizes a criterion of the form
V (pi; θ) =
1
1 + r
∑
s=g,b
pis
[
Rs(w¯s, p¯s) + θ
(
CVs(p¯s) +WVs(w¯s)
)]
− γ(pi)
for some positive θ, taking spot prices (w¯s, p¯s)s=g,b as given.
26 An equilibrium with a stake-
holder oriented firm 1 is the same as a shareholder equilibrium with the sole difference that
the criterion Definition 1 (iii) is replaced by the criterion V (pi; θ). The improvement obtained
by replacing the profit criterion by V (pi; θ) can be formalized as follows.
Proposition 6. (Stakeholder-Oriented Firm) If firm 1 uses the criterion V (pi; θ) with a small
θ, then the stakeholder-oriented equilibrium improves on the shareholder equilibrium.
Proof: For any θ ≥ 0, the equilibrium with criterion V (pi; θ) leads to the same spot prices (w¯, p¯)
and the same labor choices (l¯,
¯ˆ
l) as in the shareholder equilibrium. The choice of investment
pi(θ) which maximizes V (pi; θ) is defined by the first-order condition
Vpi(pi, θ) =
1
1 + r
[
Rg + θ
(
CV g +WV g
)]
−
[
Rb + θ
(
CV b +WV b
)]
− γ′(pi) = 0
which, when CV s and WV s are replaced by their expressions in (32), can be written as
1
1 + r
[
(1− θ)
(
Rg −Rb
)
+ θ
(
(W g −W b)− (Ŵg − Ŵb)
)]
− γ′(pi(θ)) = 0. (34)
Differentiating (34) gives
1
1 + r
[
−
(
Rg −Rb
)
+
(
(W g −W b)− (Ŵg − Ŵb)
)]
= γ′′(pi(θ))pi′(θ).
26If the stakeholder-oriented firm were permitted to use its market power on the spot markets, the prices
would be different from the competitive prices (w¯, p¯) because of the substantial weight of the shareholders in
the criterion. The relevant comparison would then be between the shareholder equilibrium in which the firm
exercises its market power and the equilibrium with the stakeholder-oriented firm also exercizing market power.
Such a comparison is outside the scope of this paper.
Proposition 1 implies
(
W g−W b
)
−
(
Rg−Rb
)
> 0, and Proposition 4 implies (Ŵg− Ŵb) < 0.
Since γ′′ > 0, pi′(θ) > 0.
Let W (θ) = δ
∑
s=g,b pis(θ)W s − γ(pi(θ)) denote the discounted expected social welfare
induced by the investment pi(θ), with derivative W ′(θ) = pi′(θ)
(
δ(W g−W b)−γ′(pi(θ))
)
. Since
γ′′ > 0 and pi′ > 0, γ′(pi(θ)) is increasing. Since by Proposition 1, δ(W g−W b) > γ′(pi(0)), W ′(0)
is positive. Thus social welfare increases for θ small enough, which proves the proposition. 2
5 Conclusion
Berle and Means (1932) classic study of the corporation is best known for showing that the
emergence of the very large scale modern corporation led inevitably to the separation between
ownership and control, and that as a result incentives have to be created to induce managers
(the control) to perform their fiduciary duty to the shareholders. However in the final chapter
on “The New Concept of the Corporation” they focused on another idea which has not been
given the same attention—that at the end of the day, it is not at all clear that a corporation
should be run exclusively in the interest of its shareholders. When a large corporation in the
pursuit of its regular activities uses “private property” (financed by its shareholders), which
in view of the scale of the corporation has important consequences for agents other than its
shareholders, then the “privateness” of the property (and hence its fiduciary aspect) comes
into question. As a result a large corporation must focus on the consequences of its actions for
the interests of all parties with whom it interacts on a regular basis.27
This broader view of the responsibility of the corporation has not caught on in the UK
or the US where it has even been vigorously attacked. To quote Friedman (1970) “there is
one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits”. In other countries, however, especially Germany, France and
Japan, corporations are run in a way that is closer to a stakeholder approach with a significant
weight placed on the workers.28 The results of a survey of managers reported by Yoshimori
(1995) show that 97% of CEOs in Japan and 84% in Germany believed that a corporation
should be run “for the interests of all stakeholders” whereas for the US 76% (for the UK 70%)
believed that “shareholder interest should be given first priority”. Thus a stakeholder approach
has made its way into the practice of some countries even though a widely accepted theory
justifying this approach has yet to be worked out.29
27...“neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount interests of the
community.... When a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally accepted,
in that moment the passive property right of today must yield before the larger interests of society. Should
the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a system comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable
service to their public, and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of the profits from the
owners of passive property, and should the community generally accept such a scheme as a logical and human
solution of industrial difficulties, the interests of passive property owners would have to give way.” (Berle-Means
(1932, p. 310)).
28In Germany by law, the system of codetermination requires that representatives of the employees be involved
in the strategic decisions of corporations; however consumers are not represented on the corporate boards.
29There is however a discussion of stakeholder theory in the management literature which defines a stakeholder
firm as one which “pursues multiple objectives of parties with different interests” (Kochan-Rubinstein (2001)).
A valid theoretical foundation for a stakeholder theory of the firm requires two precondi-
tions: (1) decisions taken by the firms must have an external effect on stakeholders (2) these
externalities must not be readily resolved by government intervention (regulation or taxation).
To obtain an operational stakeholder theory, three additional conditions must be satisfied: it
must be possible to
(i) assign well-defined benefits for each group of stakeholders
(ii) exhibit a way of assigning relative weights to the benefits of the different groups in (i) to
obtain a well-defined objective for a firm
(iii) provide incentives to the firm’s manager to maximize this objective.
Jensen (2001)30 doubts that a stakeholder approach can provide a solution to (i) and (ii).
Tirole (2001) argues that measuring consumer and worker surpluses may be difficult since
there are no liquid markets on which they can be evaluated, akin to the stock market for the
firms’ profits. If (i) can not be solved then there is no solution to (ii), so that there is no
well-defined criterion for evaluating a manager’s performance. Like Jensen, Tirole argues that
any attempt to take into account the interests of the different stakeholders leaves the firm open
to manipulation by the management: “Management can almost always rationalize any action
by invoking its impact on the welfare of some stakeholder” (Tirole (2001)).
Our analysis offers a first step to the solution of (i) and (ii): under the assumption of quasi-
linearity of agents’ preferences, profit measures the benefits of shareholders, while consumer
and worker surpluses measure the benefits accruing to consumers and workers. In the idealized
case of an economy with a single firm the stakeholder objective, which leads to the social
optimum, is to maximize the expected sum of these three benefits, i.e. it puts equal weight
on each of the benefits in (i). However this theoretical result, while formally answering (i)
and (ii), does not respond to Tirole’s concern that consumer and worker surpluses may be
difficult to evaluate in practice. We propose a solution to this difficulty by drawing on the
Coasian idea of creating property rights for externalities: if the firm can issue consumer and
worker rights, and if these rights can be traded on reasonably liquid markets, then their market
prices will reveal the benefits that consumers and workers derive from being stakeholders of
the firm. In effect our proposal would lead to reforming corporate accounting, by introducing
new assets—employee and consumer surpluses—and corresponding liabilities—employee rights
and consumer rights—in a spirit close to the proposal of Cornell-Shapiro (1987).31
If the elements of a stakeholder theory seem to fall into place in the idealized case of an
economy with a single firm, extending the theory to the more general setting where several
30“Stakeholder theory plays into the hands of managers by allowing them to pursue their own interests at the
expense of the firm’s financial claimants and society at large. It allows managers and directors to devote the
firm’s resources to their own favorite causes—the environment, art, cities, medical research. . . . By expanding
the power of managers in this unproductive way, stakeholder theory increases the agency costs in the economic
system” (Jensen (2001)).
31There is a theoretical literature that uses incomplete contracts models to explain why we see other forms
of corporation than for profit: non-profit (Glaeser and Shleifer 2001), government ownership (Hart et al. 1997),
cooperative (Hart and Moore 1998, Rey and Tirole 2000). There is also an early literature on labor managed
firms. However this paper and the contemporaneous paper of Allen et al. (2011) are the only formal models of
stakeholder firms (viewed as hybrids between for profit, consumers cooperatives and labor managed firms) that
we are aware of.
firms compete on the product and labor markets presents new difficulties. For in this setting, to
achieve the social optimum each firm would need to take into account the effect of its investment
on the expected utilities of all agents in the economy, including the consumers, workers and
shareholders of the other firms. Placing the welfare of the stakeholders of competing firms
directly into the objective function of a firm is not however a realistic proposal since it would
come into conflict with competition on the spot markets, which is required for efficiency.
Our analysis shows however that an investment that improves on the shareholder outcome is
obtained if the firm’s objective includes a positive, perhaps small, weight on just the surpluses
of its own consumers and workers. Thus a straightforward modification of the pure profit
criterion can lead to an improvement on capitalism. If full weight were placed on the surpluses
of its own consumers and workers, then the firm would exaggerate the benefit of achieving a
good outcome since it would neglect the fact that its competitors produce more and create
more surplus for the economy when it is less productive. Modifying the stakeholder criterion
by decreasing the weight placed on the surpluses of the firm’s consumers and workers implicitly
takes into account the offsetting surpluses created by the other firms.
There remain the informational and incentive problems of evaluating the surpluses and
ensuring that they are in some measure taken into account by a firm’s manager. These are
problems which are not easily addressed with the simple model of this paper in which firms
produce homogeneous goods using homogeneous labor. Extending the Coasian idea of creat-
ing consumer and worker rights requires that firms produce differentiated products and use
different types of labor or in different locations. Since in a setting with heterogeneous firms,
consumers, and workers, the price of a right will not reveal the full surplus, only the surplus
of the marginal buyer, maximizing the total value of rights seems commensurate with the the-
oretical result that only a part a firm’s consumer and worker surpluses should be taken into
account. More research is needed to find robust and practical ways of introducing markets for
consumer and worker rights, thereby enabling corporations to simultaneously take the inter-
ests of their stakeholders into account, while retaining an objective market-based criterion for
measuring management performance.
APPENDIX : Proofs
Lemma 1: W ∗g −W ∗b > R¯g − R¯b.
Proof: Consider the parameterized family of production functions for firm 1
f(t, l) = tfg(l) + (1− t)fb(l), t ∈ [ 0, 1 ]
where the parameter takes the production function continuously from the bad to the good
technology. We associate with each t ∈ [0, 1] a fictitious ‘t’ spot economy at date 1 with the
characteristics (u, v, f(t, .), fˆ). The maximized social welfare for the t economy is
W (t) = max{u(c)− v(`) | c = f(t, l) + fˆ(lˆ), ` = l + lˆ}
The solution (c(t), `(t), l(t), lˆ(t)) of this maximum problem is characterized by the equations
u′(c(t))f2(t, l(t)) = v′(`(t)), u′(c(t))fˆ ′(lˆ(t)) = v′(`(t)), (35)
c(t) = f(t, l(t)) + fˆ(lˆ(t), `(t) = l(t) + lˆ(t) (36)
and this allocation can be induced by letting agents and firms make their choices on spot
markets at prices
p(t) = u′(c(t)), w(t) = v′(l(t)).
Let R(t) = p(t)f(t, l(t)) − w(t)l(t) denote the (optimized) profit of firm 1 under these spot
prices. We show that the function
D(t) = W (t)−R(t)
is strictly increasing on [ 0, 1 ]: this will imply that D(1) = W ∗g − R¯g > D(0) = W ∗b − R¯b and
hence establish the result. By the envelope theorem
W ′(t) = u′(c(t))f1(t, l(t)), R′(t) = p′(t)f(t, l(t)) + p(t)f1(t, l(t))− w′(t)l(t).
Thus D′(t) = −p′(t)f(t, l(t))+w′(t)l(t). Since (35) implies that the marginal products of labor
are equalized, f2(t, l(t)) = fˆ
′(lˆ(t)), it follows that
p′(t) = u′′(c(t))[f1(t, l(t)) + f2(t, l(t))(l′(t) + lˆ′(t))] , w′(t) = v′′(`(t))(l′(t) + lˆ′(t)).
The change in the optimal allocation of labor to the two firms (l′(t), lˆ′(t)) can be obtained by
differentiating the FOCs for the optimal allocation of labor (35). This gives the pair of linear
equations
u′′(f1 + f2(l′ + lˆ′))f2 + u′(f21 + f22l′)− v′′(l′ + lˆ′) = 0
u′′(f1 + f2(l′ + lˆ′))f2 + u′fˆ ′′ lˆ′ − v′′(l′ + lˆ′) = 0, (37)
where the arguments of the functions have been omitted to simplify notation. Solving these
equations leads to
l′ + lˆ′ =
−u′′f1f2(f22 + fˆ ′′)− u′f21fˆ ′′
u′fˆ ′′f22 + (u′′(f2)2 − v′′)(f22 + fˆ ′′)
. (38)
The denominator is positive since f22, fˆ
′′, u′′ are negative and v′′ is positive, while the sign
of the numerator is ambiguous. However substituting this expression into D′(t) = −u′′f1f +
(v′′l − u′′f2f)(l′ + lˆ′) gives
D′(t) =
1
den
[
u′′u′ffˆ ′′(f21f2 − f1f22) + u′′v′′f1(f22 + fˆ ′′)(f − f2l)− u′v′′fˆ ′′f21l
]
where “den” is the positive denominator of l′+ lˆ′. Since by concavity of f , f − f2l > 0, all the
terms are positive and D′(t) > 0: thus moving toward the good outcome constantly increases
the welfare by more than the increase in profit.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the (t, τ) economy in which the production functions of the
two firms are f(t, l) = tfg(l) + (1− t)fb(l), fˆ(τ, lˆ) = τ fˆg(lˆ) + (1− τ)fˆb(lˆ), and the consumers
and workers have the characteristics (u, v). The maximum social welfare in the (t, τ) economy
is
W (t, τ) = max{u(c)− v(`)|c = f(t, l) + fˆ(τ, lˆ), ` = l + lˆ} (39)
We show that
∂2W
∂t∂τ
< 0, which proves the lemma since it implies W (1, 1)−W (0, 1) < W (1, 0)−
W (0, 0) ⇐⇒ W ∗gg −W ∗bg < W ∗gb −W ∗bb.
∂W
∂τ
= u′(c(t, τ))fˆ1(τ, lˆ(t, τ)),
∂2W
∂t∂τ
= u′′
(
f1 + f2
(∂l
∂t
+
∂lˆ
∂t
))
fˆ1 + u
′fˆ12
∂lˆ
∂t
where the arguments of the function in the second derivative have been omitted to simplify the
expression. As in the proof of Proposition 1, ∂l∂t and
∂lˆ
∂t can be calculated by differentiating the
FOCs of the maximum problem (39). Calculations similar to those in the proof of Proposition
1 lead to
u′′fˆ1
(
f1 + f2
(∂l
∂t
+
∂lˆ
∂t
))
= u′′fˆ1
u′f1f22fˆ22 − v′′f1(f22 + fˆ22)− u′f2f21fˆ22
u′f22fˆ22 + (u′′(f2)2 − v′′)(f22 + fˆ22)
(40)
which is negative since the numerator and the denominator of the fraction on the right side
are positive. From the calculation in the proof of Proposition 1 we also deduce
∂lˆ
∂t
=
1
u′fˆ22
(
(v′′ − u′′(f2)2)(∂l
∂t
+
∂lˆ
∂t
)− u′′f1f2
)
which after substituting the value of
∂l
∂t
+
∂lˆ
∂t
gives
∂lˆ
∂t
=
−u′f21fˆ22(v′′ − u′′(f2)2)− u′u′′f1f2f22fˆ22
u′fˆ22 den
where “‘den” is the positive denominator in (40). The numerator of the fraction is positive,
den is positive and since fˆ22 < 0,
∂lˆ
∂t
< 0. This property is intuitive: if the productivity of
firm 1 increases the amount of labor used by firm 2 in the efficient allocation decreases. Thus
the two terms in ∂
2W
∂t∂τ are negative and the result follows. 2
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove lˆb > lˆg it is sufficient to prove that lˆ
′(t) < 0, where lˆ(t) is
the optimal choice of labor by firm 2 in the artificial t economy introduced in the proof of
Proposition 1. It follows from (37) that
lˆ′ =
(v′′ − u′′(f2)2)(l′ + lˆ′)− u′′f1f2
u′fˆ ′′
Inserting the value of l′ + lˆ′ into (38) leads to
lˆ′ =
−u′f21fˆ ′′(v′′ − u′′(f2)2)− u′u′′f1f2fˆ ′′f22
u′fˆ ′′den
< 0,
where den denotes the positive denominator of (39). Thus lˆ(1) = lˆg < lˆ(0) = lˆb, which proves
the Lemma. 2
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